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If you were to write yourself IOUs to provide for your retirement and put
them in a safety deposit box, would you rest comfortably, assured that you
would be able to purchase all the necessities of life in 2020? Well,
President Clinton's plan is even worse. 
In his State of the Union Address, President Clinton offered his proposal for "saving"
Social Security by "committing" 60 percent of projected government budget surpluses for
the next 15 years to that purpose. This was widely, and wildly, hailed as the right thing to
do. But does it make any sense? 
The president's plan relies critically on several unexamined assumptions. Most obviously, it
relies on budget surpluses far into the future. The plan would "transfer" more than $2.7
trillion from projected general budget surpluses to the Social Security Trust Fund over the
next 15 years. The president's unbounded optimism allowed him to claim, "We are on a
course for budget surpluses for the next 25 years," but our nation has never —let me
repeat, never—run budget surpluses for such a period. Indeed, every time we had
significant surpluses, the economy quickly collapsed into a depression that created budget
deficits. Our federal government will not  run surpluses for the next 25 years or the next 15
years. But if simply wishing for something can make it so, why not project surpluses for
the next 1,000 years that would total billions of quadrillions and use a measly 5 percent of
that to solve the Social Security problem? 
Close examination of the president's projections (as presented by the Office of
Management and Budget) reveals that the federal government will continue to run a
significant "on-budget" deficit through 2003, with "off-budget" revenues accounting for all
the projected surpluses. These off-budget revenues come entirely from Social Security
taxes. According to projections of the Social Security Trustees, payroll tax revenues will
exceed Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASDI) expenditures
by $119 billion in 2003, with the surplus rising to $159 billion in 2008. Looking at the two
projections together shows that the president's projected surplus of $150 billion in 2003
will be achieved mainly thanks to the $119 billion surplus run by Social Security. In other
words, 60 percent of federal budget surpluses—created for the most part by Social
Security`is being counted toward saving Social Security! However, the real question remains: Will setting aside any surpluses realized during the
next several years really help ease the budgetary burden of the baby boomers' retirement?
To answer this question, one must understand that when OASDI runs a surplus, the
Treasury creates an interest-earning IOU, a nontradable bond, that is held by the Social
Security Trust Fund. This IOU is essentially a debt the government owes itself. Because
the overall federal budget (including off-budget revenues) is projected to run surpluses in
the coming years, the Treasury will actually retire some outstanding bonds held by the
public each year, with the amount retired being somewhat less than the projected surpluses
(hence President Clinton's claim that the outstanding publicly held  stock of government
debt will fall). Curiously, the gross federal debt will actually rise by nearly $600 billion by
2003 in spite of projected surpluses  because the Treasury will have to create debt to be
held by OASDI. Thus, while it is true that the public will hold fewer bonds, the
government will become increasingly indebted—to itself . 
Even if the federal government could maintain a balanced budget forever, the Treasury
would have to go into debt by another $2.3 trillion by 2020 as it issues bonds to be held by
the Trust Fund; according to the Social Security Trustees' more optimistic assumptions, the
Treasury would have to create $51 trillion in new bonds to be held by OASDI between
today and 2075. Remember, this is debt that will be created so that the government can
owe itself. President Clinton's plan would increase the government's indebtedness (to itself)
by another $2.7 trillion because the Treasury would issue debt equal to 60 percent of the
government's surpluses to be added to the Trust Fund's accumulation of bonds. The greater
the surpluses, the more indebted the Treasury becomes! To complicate the already
Byzantine nature of these finances, the Treasury pays compound interest on all this debt by
issuing more IOUs to the Trust Fund—the higher the interest rate, the more the
government owes itself and, hence, the sounder Social Security becomes. If you can follow
the accounting logic of all this, the Clinton administration may have a position for you. 
Will this debt—whether it is "set aside" or not—help to provide for retiring baby boomers?
If you were to write yourself IOUs to provide for your retirement and put them in a safety
deposit box, would you rest comfortably, assured that you would be able to purchase all
the necessities of life in 2020? Of course not. But isn't that what President Clinton's plan
amounts to? No—actually his plan is even worse. 
What if a pension fund approached you with a retirement plan according to which you
were to pay a safety deposit box fee equal to 2 percent of your annual income so that you
could safeguard your own IOUs to be taken out of the box in 2020 and sold in order to
raise the cash required to support you in your old age? You would rightly argue that if
sales of your own IOUs can really support you in your old age, you would prefer to write
them in 2020 rather than paying the 2 percent annual fee; that would at least allow you to
consume, or to save, the 2 percent in the meantime. 
President Clinton's plan consists of taxing current workers about 2 percent more than is
needed to cover all OASDI expenditures, writing IOUs that are stored at the Treasury, and
then taking out the IOUs in 2020 and turning them back over to the Treasury, which will
then have to raise cash by issuing bonds or increasing taxes—exactly what would have to
be done regardless of the existence of the Trust Fund. Unless retirees can eat Treasury
bonds, the president's plan will have done nothing to provide for them. Milton Friedman recently made a similar argument. He pointed out that paying taxes today
to build up a trust fund cannot help provide for future retirees. Indeed, a trust fund is little
more than an accounting gimmick. 
Taxes paid by today's workers are used to pay today's retirees. If money is left
over, it finances other Government spending—though, to maintain the
insurance fiction, paper entries are created in a "trust fund" that is
simultaneously an asset and a liability of the Government. When the benefits
that are due exceed the proceeds from payroll taxes, as they will in the not
very distant future, the difference will have to be financed by raising taxes,
borrowing, creating money or reducing other Government spending. And that
is true no matter how large the "trust fund." (Milton Friedman, "Social
Security Chimeras," New York Times,  January 11, 1999, A17)
To be fair, there is nothing necessarily wrong with planning to use borrowing or additional
taxes in 2020 to care for retiring baby boomers. Indeed, there is no alternative. But why
doesn't the president simply state that that is his plan? It makes no sense to tax current
workers more than is needed to cover current expenditures simply to allow the government
to increase its debt to itself to maintain the subterfuge that this somehow will allow it to
avoid doing what it must do in 2020. Current workers could enjoy a tax cut now, and this
would have no impact whatsoever on what must be done in 2020 to provide for retirees. 
The current notion behind the operation of OASDI is to accumulate financial assets now,
in the belief that these can be depleted in later years when Social Security program
expenditures exceed the revenues that will be generated from a shrinking taxable base. In
other words, the "saving" represented by the annual surpluses will be accumulated over the
next 20 years in order to provide for future "consumption" by retiring baby boomers.
Clearly, the retirees will not be able to "consume" the Trust Fund (which will consist solely
of bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government). They will need a
"real" basket of consumer goods when they retire. The question is this: Can the current
generation, as a whole, save in real terms for its future retirement? 
If the current generation were to abstain from consumption, dig holes, and bury goods and
services to be excavated and consumed 20 years hence, we could clearly provide for future
consumption by saving (in real terms) today. Presumably, the pharaohs had something like
this in mind when they buried goods, as well as those who would provide services, with
them in the pyramids. However, today, outside of the stockpiles of a handful of
"survivalists," this sort of real saving is not significant. That is, most of the consumption that
occurs in, say, 2020 will have to be provided for by production in that year, with the
notable exception of owner-occupied housing. In other words, the Social Security Trust
Fund (and all other public and private pension funds) are "saving" only in financial terms,
in the hope that retirees will be able to purchase real goods and services at the time they
retire for consumption at that date. 
Is it possible for society to do anything today to increase the quantity of goods and services
that can and will be produced in 2020 for consumption not only by retirees but also by all
nonretirees (working or not working)? If not, the financial savings represented by the
Social Security Trust Fund (and all the other public and private pension savings) can affect
only the distribution  of goods and services produced in 2020. The current debate, then,seems to center around a fear that if we do not "reform" Social Security, the retiring baby
boomers will not get a sufficient share of society's output in 2020 or some later year. 
If this is really what the debate is all about, the president's proposal does no good. His
reform aims to increase the size of the Trust Fund and its rate of growth over the future (by
"investing" a portion of it in the stock market to obtain higher returns than those expected
from its government bonds), thereby postponing the "day of reckoning" by 55 years,
according to his calculations. However, unless accumulation of the Trust Fund actually
enhances society's ability to produce goods and services in the year 2020, the amount to
be distributed will be exactly the same whether the Trust Fund is larger or smaller. The
only economic justification for an accumulation of assets is the belief that it will increase
the distribution going to retirees. However, there is no way to guarantee that the
accumulation of assets in the Trust Fund will actually bring about this result, and it is not
clear that a larger fund will result in a more desirable distribution. 
Is there a better and more direct way to ensure that the distribution will be shifted toward
retiring baby boomers? Yes—through the tax system. In the year 2020, if it is decided that
the elderly should get a larger share of the distribution, then payroll taxes would be
increased (reducing disposable income of workers and thus their consumption), allowing
benefit payments to the elderly to rise.(According to the Social Security Trustees' current
intermediate projections, the payroll tax rate will have to be increased by 2.26
percent—1.13 percent each on employers and employees—in 2020 to generate enough
revenue to cover OASDI expenditures.) 
In conclusion, it would be far more straightforward simply to increase the tax on workers in
the year 2020 and increase the benefits paid to retirees at that time than to try to
accumulate financial reserves over the next 21 years in the hope that the OASDI Trustees
could affect distribution by turning bonds back to the Treasury, which would then sell
bonds in the year 2020 to raise the cash it would turn over to OASDI. This could work
smoothly only if those who obtained income from working in the year 2020 decided to
reduce consumption in the year 2020 in order to buy bonds. It is possible, perhaps likely,
that the asset sales would merely depress asset prices and that the competition for
consumption by workers and retirees would drive up prices of goods and services. While it
is conceivable that the net result would be a greater distribution going to the elderly, that is
not a foregone conclusion. Why not simply use the tax system in the year 2020 or 2030 or
2075 to guarantee the desired result? 
The burden of providing real goods and services to retirees in 2020, 2030, or 2075 will be
borne by workers in those years regardless of the tax imposed today. And if the amount to
be produced cannot be increased by actions taken today, then the burden that will be borne
cannot be reduced by anything we do today. Nothing the president has proposed will
reduce the burden placed on workers in the year 2020. The president has merely asked
workers today to make a sacrifice by paying unnecessarily high taxes without in any way
shifting the burden from future workers. This is pain without gain and is bad public policy. 
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